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DYNAMIC CO-EXISTENCE OF COMPANY-OWNED AND
 
FRANCHISED OUTLETS WITHIN A COMPANY: A
 
FRAMEWORK OF THE FRANCHISOR'S PERSPECTIVE
 
BOONGHEE YOO, Hofstra University 
ROBERT E. SIBLEY, San Jose Stat~ U!li~e~i~ 
Why and how do company-owned and franchised outlets simultaneously exist within the same 
organization? The purpose of this article is to integrate a variety of theories on this interesting 
retailphenomenon into a broader theoreticalframework based on thepolitical-economy paradigm. 
This paper attempts to integrate the perspectives of several theories that previously have been 
considered competing models of a single reality-the access-to-capital viewpoint, transaction cost 
analysis, the population ecology perspective, and power-dependence-conflict arguments-into a 
broader perspective that utilizes intra-firm factors and the internal and external economies and 
polities of the political-economy paradigm. A model depicting this integration is set forth and 
nineteen research propositions stemmingfrom this model are proposed 
INTRODUCTION 
Franchise systems are an important channel form, 
accounting for about 40 percent of all retail sales in 
the UnitedStates(InternationalFranchise Association, 
2002). Scholars have been curious about why firms 
choosefranchisingversus company-<>wnedoutlets an  
why, in many cases, a dual system of operation (i.e., 
both franchised and company-owned outlets) has 
evolved. The presence of both market-like and 
hierarchy-like features in franchise organizations has 
attracted significant attention from researchers 
(Anderson 1984, Bradach and Eccles 1989, Brickley 
and Dark 1987, Brickley, Dark and Weisbach 1991, 
Carney and Gedajlovic 1991, Dant, Kaufmann, 
Paswan 1992, Martin 1988, Norton 1988a, 1988b, 
Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997, Thompson 1992, 
Williamson 1991). 
Market-like transactions take place between 
franchisors and franchisees-two independent 
entities-in capital, labor, and product markets. For 
example,the franchisor developsa product or service 
to sell to franchisees. The hierarchy-like features 
stem from the quasi-vertical integration found 
betweenthese two entities. For example,a franchisor 
provides substantial operational support to the 
franchisee and the franchisee conforms to the 
fra chisor's provisions. Thus, franchise 
organizations are neither totally independent 
operations (market) nor completely vertically 
integr ted ones {hierarchy). While transaction cost 
analysi  (TCA) theory posits an intermediate point 
(i.e., hybrids) between markets and hierarchies 
(Williamson1985,1991), BradachandEccles(l989) 
i tain that franchise systems operate in plural 
forms using both market and hierarchy governance 
structures simultaneously to perform the same 
function. They argue that this provides unique 
synergisticbenefitsand, thus, shouldbe distinguished 
from the TCA typology of market and hierarchy 
gover ance structures. 
Among the theoretical reasons for firms' selections of 
franchising are: (1) the ease of raising capital (Caves 
and Murphy 1976, Hunt 1973, Oxenfeldt and Kelly 
1969); (2) risk-sharing with franchisors, as well as 
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infonnation advantages explained by agency theory 
(Brickley and Dark 1987, Brickley, Combs and 
Ketchen 1999, Dark and Weisbach 1991, Carney and 
Gedajlovic 1991, Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
LaFontaine 1992, Mathewson and Winter 1985, 
Norton 1988a, 1988b, Thompson 1992); (3) 
economizing on transaction and governance costs 
(Dahlstrom and Nygaad 1999, Klein 1980, 
Williamson 1985, 1991); (4) different level of 
responsiveness to competition and environmental 
changes as interpreted by the population ecology 
viewpoint (Pilling, Henson and Yoo 1995, Yoo, 
Donthu and Pilling 1998); and (5) power and conflict 
dynamics as found in socio-psychologicaltheories. 
We argue that, giventhe complexityof the franchising 
phenomenon, no one perspective is superior to the 
others because the perspectives do not compete with 
each other to provide exclusive and exhaustive 
alternative explanations. By investigating different 
aspects of the same realitythrough differentvariables, 
each of the theories contributes to an overall 
understanding of the factors that allow the co­
existence of (as well as shifts between) company-
owned outlets and franchisees within the same 
organization. The purpose of this article is to 
integrate these five theories into a framework of 
broadenedperspectivebased on the political-economy 
taxonomy (cf. laId 1970, Stem and Reve 1980, Arndt 
1983). In particular, this paper attempts to describe 
and explain the internal/external economy/polity of 
why and how company-ownedand franchised outlets 
co-exist simultaneouslywithin the same organization. 
The developedconceptual framework is based on the 
political-economy paradigm, which proposes a 
balanced presentation of internal and external factors 
on the inter-organizationalrelations of a channeldyad 
(see Achrol, Reve and Stem 1983, Arndt 1983, 
Dahlstrom and Dwyer 1992, Dwyer and Oh 1987, 
Dwyer and Welsh 1985, Reve and Stem 1985, Stem 
and Reve 1980, laId 1970). The political-economy 
framework for comparative analysis of marketing 
channels insists that internal and external economic 
and sociopolitical forces should not be analyzed. 
Stem (1988) recommendspolitica1-economyanalysis 
not as a theory itself, but as a foundation for theory 
building in marketing channels and as the proper aid 
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for charting-out a demonstration of the complex 
interrelations of relevant theories. He writes: 
First, while I firmly believe that 
viewing marketing channels as 
political economies is appropriate 
and helpful, the political-economy 
perspective merely provides a 
framework. It is not a theory, and 
makes no pretense to being one. Its 
primary message is that, in order to 
understand and map channel 
interactions, economic and 
behavioral variables must be 
webbed in some holistic manner. 
To advance knowledge in this area, 
theories must be brought to the 
framework, and the most fertile 
ground for those theories is 
probably in the basic disciplines 
(Stem 1988, p.2). 
THE FRAMEWORK 
Previous research on franchising phenomena within 
the fields of marketing, economics, finance, law, 
organization and socio-psychology literature, has 
guided us in constructing this comprehensive 
conceptualization of franchising versus ownership 
choice. The framework defines the channel dyad of 
a franchisor and its franchisee as the fundamental 
unit of analysis because transactions betweenthe two 
actors are very important to the inter-organizational 
study of marketing channels. However, our model is 
primarily focused on the franchisor's perspective 
since it is franchisors that determine whether a 
company's retail outlets will be company-owned, 
franchised, or both. 
Focusing on inter-firm relations, the classic political-
economy framework omits intra-firm phenomena that 
are antecedents of and ongoing influences on inter-
firm relations. Our model attempts to capture intra­
firm characteristics and dynamics. Thus, the intra­
firm factors of both franchisors and franchisees and 
the internal and external forces in economic and 
sociop litical areas that all affect the dyad are unified 
in one model. 
24 
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The political-economy approach perceives an 
organization to be sets of important economic and 
sociopolitical factors that interact to influence 
collectivebehavior and performance (Stem and Reve 
1980). Economy/polity and intemallexternal 
dimensions are considered central in a political-
economy framework (Arndt 1983, Stem and Reve 
1980, Zald 1970). Polity refers to "the power-and­
control systems of a social unit (e.g., an organization), 
a network of social units or a society." Economy is 
"the productive exchange system of a social unit or 
society transforming inputs to outputs." The 
internal/external dimension consists of "the external 
(environmental)versus internal (organizational)polity 
and economy" (Arndt 1983, p. 48). Consequently, 
this study's framework has four categories: (1) the 
internaleconomy,i.e., "the internal economicstructure 
and processes," (2) the internal polity, i.e., "the 
internalsociopoliticalstructure and processes," (3) the 
external economy,i.e., "the nature of its vertical (input 
and output) and horizontal markets," and (4) the 
external polity, i.e., "the distribution and use ofpower 
resources among external actors." These four 
categories interact and influence each other, and it is 





Intra-firm factors deal with production, transaction, 
and agency costs for each memberof the dyad. Major 
intra-factors of the franchisor are the franchisor's 
capital needs and agency costs. Major intra-factors of 
the franchisee are the franchisee's relative 
performance and the relative salvage value of a 
franchise. 
As mentioned above, due to its emphasis on inter-
organizational relations, the traditional political-
economy paradigm allows no room for intra-firm 
factors which playa critical role in inter-firm 
relations, as marketing scholars have long contended 
(see Arndt 1983, Stem and Reve 1980). Ignoring 
intra-firm factors can make it difficult to apply the 
political-economy framework to research on 
determinants of economic structure (e.g., what 
determines a company's preference of vertical 
integration or makes the company decide to terminate 
Yoo and Sibley 
relatio s with its partner). Basically, the political-
economy approach assumes an on-going relationship 
between two parties in perpetuity even though the 
content of the relationship differs due to internal and 
external forces. Therefore, we need to look at intra­
firm f ctors to more comprehensively understand the 
interactions between two parties. 
The a alysis of intra-firm characteristics and 
dynamics which impact on inter-firm relations of the 
dyad is drawn largely from TCA (Williamson 1985) 
and agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983). TCA 
posits that the efficacy of channel arrangements is 
chieved by economizingor minimizing transaction 
costs, that is, "the costs of running the economic 
system" (Arrow 1969, p. 48), which are determined 
by such transactional attributes as transactional 
frequency, asset specificity and uncertainty 
(Williamson 1985). However, transaction costs 
shouldbe weightedagainst correspondingproduction 
costs at a given form of organization since 
transaction cost economizing should not 
underestimate "first-order economizing--effective 
adaptation and elimination of waste" (Williamson 
1991). In other words, transaction costs should be 
considered together with production costs to 
minimizetotal cost. 
TCA maintains that "transactions, which differ in 
their attributes, are aligned with governance 
structures, which differ in their cost and 
ompetencies" (Williamson 1991, p. 277). Here, 
human aspects cannot be ignored, and it has been 
postulated that "human agents are given to 
opp rtunism, which is a condition of self-interest 
seeking with guile" (Williamson 1985, p. 30). For 
example, in a transaction with high specific 
i vestments,vertical integrationis less costly than an 
arms-length market transaction (Bradach and Eccles 
1989). 
Like TCA, agency theory concentrates on the 
principal-agent relationship (i.e., in this context, 
franc isor-franchiseeor franchisor as an employerof 
employee-managers) and considers characteristics 
and behaviors of both a principal and its agent 
(Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992, Fama and Jensen 
1983). Agencytheory considers the pertinent agency 
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costs as a major determinant of organizational form. 
As Fama and Jensen (1983) maintain, "An 
organizational form survives in an activity when the 
costs and benefits of its residual claims and 
approaches it provides in controllingagencyproblems 
combinewith availableproductiontechnologyto allow 
the organization to deliver products at lower prices 
than other organizational forms" (p. 333). 
Franchisor's Intra-Firm Factors 
Franchisor's Capital Needs 
The capital-raising argument views franchising as a 
source of capital for small business expansion. In 
this way, the franchisor can raise capital less 
expensively than using other plans (Caves and 
Murphy 1976). Thus, franchisees are considered an 
economicalsource of expansioncapital. Accordingto 
this idea, small companies with limited access to 
capital markets use franchising to expand their 
business. Later as the companymatures and no longer 
has the same expansionary capital needs, the owners 
buy back the most profitable units. Thus, it is 
expected that successful franchise systems will tend 
toward perfect companyownership(Hunt 1973,Lillis, 
Narayana and Gilman 1976, Oxenfeldt and Kelly 
1969, Zeller, Achabal and Brown 1980). 
Consequently: 
Proposition 1. As potentialfranchisors require more 
capital they more likely choose franchising. 
Proposition 2. As potential franchisors require more 
capital they more likely increase economic incentives 
(e.g., lower up-front and royalty fees) to encourage 
rapid investment decisions by franchisee prospects to 
speed up cash inflows. 
Franchisor's Agency Costs 
Agency costs are "the costs of aligningthe incentives 
of principals and agents, including bonding and 
monitoring and related forgone output attributable to 
those activities" (Fama and Jensen 1983). A 
franchisor will compare agency costs between its two 
possible types of agents, employee-managers and 
franchisees, and will select the less-costly type. If 
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agency costs are too expensive, the organization must 
change its organizational form. Agency costs are a 
function of agents' opportunism, which assumes that 
agents will act in their own best interests if given the 
chance (Williamson 1985). However, Bradach and 
Eccles (1989) maintain that, where opportunism 
might be reasonably anticipated, trust predominates 
(e.g., in franchising arrangements) because it 
promises reciprocal benefits to both parties to a 
principal-agent relationship. 
Lafontaine (1992) found that, instead of the 
franchisor's need for capital, a more significant 
expl nation for firms choosing to franchise is that 
both the agent (franchisee) and the principal 
(franchisor) prefer franchising because of its ability 
to reduce or prevent moral hazard on both sides. 
Under this view, there really are incentive issues for 
f anchisors and franchisees. Within an organization 
the co-existence of franchisees and company-owned 
outlets gives the franchisor inter-firm and intra-firm 
control mechanisms since a franchised or company-
run outlet risks ownership change whenever its 
agency costs become too high (Bradach and Eccles 
1989, Combs and Ketchen 1999). Thus: 
Proposition 3. Company ownership decreases 
when the cost of monitoring employee-managers 
mcreases 
Proposition 4. Company ownership decreases 
when the level of non-repeat customers decreases 
Pr position 5. Company ownership decreases 
when the investment needed to start a new unit 
decreases. 
Franchisee's Intra-Firm Factors 
Relative Performance of a Franchisee 
A franchisee's relative performance is measured by 
comparing a franchisee's performance to the 
performance that can be achieved if the franchisee is 
replaced by a corresponding company-owned outlet. 
From the franchisor's perspective, the expected and 
actual performances of the franchisee greatly 
influence the franchisor's decision to franchise. 
26 
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Here, effectiveness, efficiency, and adaptability are the 
measurements of performance (Ruekert, Walker and 
Roering 1985). Effectiveness is defined as the extent 
to which organizational goals are reached (Parsons 
1992) and can be operationalized as market share, net 
income, or sales. Efficiency concerns the allocation of 
resources among alternative uses and often measures 
the degree to which the minimum possible input is 
used to capture a given output, or the degree to which 
the maximum possible output is acquired from a given 
input (see Donthu and Yoo 1998, Yoo, Donthu and 
Pilling 1998). Efficiency can be measured as the ratio 
of multiple inputs to multiple outputs. Adaptability or 
responsiveness is defined as the speed with which a 
company responds to changing competition and 
environments (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1989), as 
measured by the population ecology model (see 
Pilling, Henson and Yoo 1995). 
Research has shown franchisees are superior to 
company outlets mainly for two reasons. First, 
because franchisees have more entrepreneurial 
ambition to generate profits than the managers of 
company-ownedoutlets do, they often achieve better 
performance (Norton 1988a, 1988b, Rubin 1978, 
Shelton 1967, Wattel 1968). Second, a franchisee 
investor enters a franchise system only when there is 
a high probability of profitability. Research indicates 
that a high gross margin is a franchisee's primary 
consideration (Burton, Cross and Rhodes 2000, 
Weinrauch 1986),followedby training or know-how, 
greater independence, and the presence of an 
established trademark (Bradach and Eccles 1989, 
Peterson and Dant 1990). Therefore: 
Proposition 6. As a franchisee outperforms an 
average company-owned outlet, the franchisor will 
open a new franchised outlet or continuethe on-going 
relationshipwith the current franchiseeto improvethe 
franchisor's financing bases, capabilities, and 
creditworthiness. 
Relative Salvage Value of a Franchisee 
The franchisee's relative salvage value is the 
differencebetween the "cash-out" sellingprice of the 
franchised outlet and the franchisee's initial 
roo and Sibley 
inv stment to enter that franchise system. The 
franchisee cannot avoid the required initial 
investment to enter a franchise system. As the 
investment increases, the relative salvage value 
decreases. In franchising contexts, the investment 
tends to be highly non-salvageable;for example, one 
cannot easily sell the big arch of the golden letter 
"M" at a McDonald's. Such unrecoverable and 
transa tion-specific investments, termed by 
Williamson (1985) as specific or dedicated assets, 
inclu e site specificity, physical asset specificity, 
uman-asset specificity, brand name capital, 
dedicated assets, and temporal specificity 
(Williamson 1991). If the contract law is unfair to 
the franchisee,then the franchisee's non-redeployable 
transaction-specificassets will encountermore severe 
"lock-in effects, on which account autonomous 
trading will be commonly supplanted by unified 
ownership (vertical integration)" (Williamson 1985, 
p.53). 
This works as a self-enforcingmechanism (Wathne 
and Heide 2000). However, the franchisee's vertical 
integration cannot be developed until the contract 
with its franchisor is terminated; without the 
franchisor's trademark, the franchisee cannot enjoy 
any benefits from the relationship since its 
performance is based on high interdependencywith 
its franchisor. Nevertheless, a franchisor may not be 
willing to wait to terminate the franchise contract 
until the salvage value is low, which makes 
continuing the relationship too expensive for the 
franchisor. Caves and Murphy (1976) posit that a 
franchisor tends to repurchase its franchise if 
potential returns from changing company ownership 
exceedthe costs of repurchasingthe franchise. Thus: 
Proposition 7. As the reacquisition cost of the 
franchise decreases, ownership redirection from 
franchisee to franchisor increases. 
THE INTERNAL ECONOMY 
This category is divided into two subgroups--internal 
economic structure and processes. The internal 
economic structure refers to "a type of transactional 
form linking channel members (e.g., vertical 
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integration versus market)" (Stem and Reve 1980, p. 
54) ranging from independent agencies to integrated 
hierarchies. The internal economic processes refer to 
"the nature of the decision mechanisms employed to 
determine the terms of trade among the members" 
(Stem and Reve 1980, p. 54). At the intra-firm level, 
a franchise company can select one of three 
transactional forms that correspond to Williamson's 
(1985, 1991) hierarchies, markets, and hybrids 
respectively: entirely company-owned outlets, entirely 
franchised outlets, and a mixture of both. In terms of 
the internal economic structure of a franchisor-
franchisee channel dyad, however, a franchisor can 
move between continuity and termination of a 
franchising relationship as a strategic move between 
hierarchy and market. 
Decision-making may be probabilistic, depending on 
many other inter-organizational and environmental 
forces, even though there are only two levels of 
organization in a franchising dyad. The probability of 
franchising leads us to predict the opening of a new 
location for a franchised or company-owned outlet, 
termination of a franchising contract with the current 
franchisee, or replacement of one organizational form 
(franchised or company-owned) with the other. At the 
firm level, this probability can be transformed into the 
proportion of franchised outlets to the total number of 
outlets in a franchise system. 
Even though bureaucracy issues such as 
centralization, formalization, specialization/ 
differentiation or complexity, and participation in 
decision making have greatly affected the internal 
economicstructure (Arndt 1983, Dwyer and Oh 1988, 
Ruekert, Walker and Roofing 1985, Stem and Reve 
1980), it is noteworthy that they show significant 
differences only when different forms of organization 
are compared. Thus, bureaucracy is important 
betweendifferent organizationalforms, not within the 
same organizational form (see Dwyer and Oh 1988). 
From the franchisor's perspective, if a company-
owned unit is compared to a franchised one, the 
franchised unit will show lower centralization, higher 
formalization, and higher participation in decision 
making since basically the latter is less integratedwith 
the franchisor than the former. 
Yoo and Sibley 
. Internal economicprocesses are driving forces in the 
economic exchange decisions between the members 
of the channel dyad. Some examples are allocation 
rul s and incentive systems (Arndt 1983, Zald 1970). 
Thes  decision mechanisms are constrained by the 
int rnal structure (Stem and Reve 1980). In the 
franchising context, the mechanisms are an 
agreement between the franchisor and franchisee on 
royalty fees, sales-reporting, improving the value of 
the trademark, and other services and obligations. 
Economic Rules and Incentives for a Franchisee 
The llocation rules refer to accounting and 
udg ting information, as well as to decision 
instruments developed to ensure compliance with 
decisions and to promote efficiency (Arndt 1983). 
Examples in franchising are royalty fees and sales 
report agreements. Incentive allocations are defined 
as "the distribution of rewards and sanctions to 
motivate role performance" (Zald 1970, p. 251). 
Thes  systems contain monetary/non-monetaryand 
c ntractual/non-contractual incentives to bond the 
targ t firm to the source firm and make the source 
firm more dependenton the target firm. A franchisor 
can offer various incentivessuch as market surveys, 
site s lection assistance, store design and 
i provement, management training programs, 
operating manuals, equipment packages, regular 
operating assistance, coop-ad, and promotion(Knight 
1986). In short: 
Pr position 8. When a franchisee is offered more 
favorable economic rules and higher economic 
incentives, it performs better. 
THE INTERNAL POLITY 
Like internal economy, this category is divided into 
two subgroups: the internal sociopolitical structure 
and the internal sociopolitical processes. Internal 
sociopolitical structure refers to "the pattern of 
power-dependence relations which exist among 
c ann lmembers" (Stem and Reve 1980, p. 54) that 
"identify an individual's position in a hierarchy" 
(Dahlstrom and Dwyer 1992, p. 48). Internal 
sociopolitical processes refer to "the dominant 
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sentiments (e.g., cooperation and/or conflict) within 
the channel" (Stem and Reve 1980, p. 54). 
In general, polity is viewed as "the allocation and use 
of authority and power within the system" (Stem and 
Reve 1980, p. 57, also see Emerson 1962). In the 
framework of this research, the internal sociopolitical 
structure consists of: (1) a franchisor's dependence on 
its franchisee, (2) the franchisee's power over the 
franchisor, and (3) the franchisor's coercive power 
over the franchisee. The internal sociopolitical 
processes consist of: (1) the unfairness of the 
contractual agreement, (2) conflict, (3) cooperation, 
and (4) competition within the same franchise system. 
Williamson (1984) said, "credible commitments and 
credible threats...appear mainly in conjunction with 
irreversible, specialized investments" (p. 33). A 
franchisor may be tempted to be opportunistic since a 
franchisee invests significant unrecoverable assets that 
become hostages to the franchisor's orders and the 
franchisee's performance is one-sidedly interpreted by 
the franchisor. Among typical opportunistic behaviors 
of the franchisor are agreement renewal refusal 
hazards, underestimation of the franchisee's specific 
investment, and incomplete or maladaptive contracts 
which are open to contingencies during contract 
execution (see Williamson 1984). 
Contractual Agreement Unfairness 
The primary reason that franchise systems are not 
somewhere on the continuum of the market and 
hierarchy dichotomy is that they operate under a 
distinctive type of contract law (Williamson 1985, 
1991). A franchisee has greater autonomy than in a 
hierarchy but must follow more rules and undergo 
more surveillance than a market. The franchisor 
exercisessignificantlymore power over the franchisee 
through one-sided contract termination and 
performance supervision (Klein 1980, Preble and 
Hoffman 1999, Williamson 1984). The ability of the 
franchisor to unilaterally terminate a franchise is 
essential to the franchise ownership choice (Dant, 
Kaufinann and Paswan 1992). In general, the 
franchisor always has a greater initiative of contract 
termination since it can arbitrarily evaluate the 
performance and behavior of its franchisee. 
roo and Sibley 
In this study, the franchise relationship resemblesan 
employer-employee contract--the implicit contract 
law ofintemal organization (Norton 1988a, 1988b, 
Williamson 1985). An unfair contract between a 
franchisor and its franchisee can be measured in 
compariso1'lto the contract among the company-
owned outlets on the same issues (Bradach and 
Eccl s 1989). The two contracts can be compared 
b cause a franchisor utilizes two different control 
mechanismsto accomplishthe samefunction. Unfair 
and incomplete franchise laws favorable to 
franchisors are conventionalsincefranchisors tend to 
apply the forbearance doctrine (Hadfield 1990). 
How ver, Williamson (1985) suggests relational 
contracting or bilateral governance where a 
contractual market relationship remains steady since 
the transactions in franchising are frequent and 
dictated by transaction-specific investments. 
Hei e (1992) also predicts bilateral governance for 
franchise-like relationships, where "the parties jointly 
de elop policies directed toward the achievement of 
common goals" (p. 10). Both parties benefit from 
mainta ning the relationship because they can avoid 
the loss of investments and jeopardy to the reputation 
f the trademark. The norms of obligation and 
cooperation suggest shared values exist between the 
two parties (Bradach and Eccles 1989, Heide and 
John 1992, Kaufinann and Stem 1988). In the 
franchising context, these norms include decreased 
risk of free-riding, increased goal congruence, and the 
d velopment of common beliefs and values. In 
summary: 
Proposition 9. An unbalanced or unfair power 
scheme allows the franchisor to exercise coercive 
power over the franchisee, leading to a lower degree 
of oop ration. 
Cooperation 
Som  researchers have conceptualized cooperation as 
inversely related to conflict, that is, as one of the two 
ends of the cooperation-conflict continuum; others 
have thought of cooperation and conflict as different 
concepts (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990, Gaski 
1984). In this framework, cooperation is treated 
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separately from conflict since it is postulated that 
lower levels of cooperation precede conflict. 
Anderson and Narus (1990) define cooperation as 
"similar or complementarycoordinated actions taken 
by firms in interdependent relationships to achieve 
mutual outcomes or singular outcomes with expected 
reciprocation over time" (p. 45). They found that 
cooperation is positively affected by communication 
and outcomes in comparison with alternatives, and 
favorably affects both trust and evaluations of recent 
efforts to solve disagreements (Anderson and Narus 
1990). Consequently: 
Proposition 10. An increase in the cooperative 
behavior of a franchisee leads to a decrease in conflict 
with its franchisor. 
Franchisor's Dependence on the Franchisee 
Frazier (1984) maintains, "the performance of the 
source's firm on elementsof its channel role or its role 
performance, its perceivedability to carry out inherent 
responsibilities, will largely determine the target's 
need to maintain their exchange relationship" (p. 70). 
Thus, when the franchisor favorably perceives the 
franchisee's role performance, its dependenceon the 
franchisee will increase. Keith, Jackson and Crosby 
(1990) found that coercive influence strategies (e.g., 
punishments) are more effective than non-coercive 
ones (e.g., reward, expert, referent, and legitimate 
strategies) since they can be targeted to both an 
individual channel member and to an individual 
behavior or performance (Etgar 1978). The more 
dependentchannel member tends to obey its partner's 
request and such obedienceis contradictoryto the use 
of coercive power. Thus: 
Proposition 11. A franchisor that is more dependent 
on its franchisee will be less likely to use coercive 
influence strategies against that franchisee. 
Competition within the Same Franchise System 
If the number of franchisees in a specific geographic 
area within the same franchise system is large, then 
inter-franchise rivalry increases (Dant and Gundlach 
1999, Ghosh and Craig 1991, Kaufinann and Rangan 
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1990, Zeller, Achabal and Brown 1980). The rivalry 
becomes severe if the available resources (e.g., 
potential buyers) are not sufficient for the members 
of the franchise system to meet their growth targets 
(S midt and Kochan 1972). Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) postulate three types of rivalry: (1) a 
compe itiverivalry (essentiallya zero sum game; the 
outcome of one party can be higher only if the 
outcome for the other is lower); (2) a symbiotic 
rivalry (where both parties become worse off or 
bette  off at the same time); and (3) an asymmetric 
rivalry (that is, a mixture of competitive and 
symbiotic rivalries) (p. 41). 
Franchisor-franchiseerivalry, which emerges due to 
the dual distribution channel of company-ownedand 
franchised outlets in the same market, eradicates the 
synergies of franchising set forth by Bradach and 
Eccles (1989) and Jensen (1989), and requires 
m dificationof the organizationalstructure toward a 
stable dual distribution system (Dant, Kaufinann and 
Paswan 1992). Given the extent of goal 
incompatibility and resource scarcity, failure to 
address this type of rivalry can develop into terminal 
conflict (Schmidt and Kochan 1972). The rivalry 
might b  accelerated when consumers do not 
differentiatebetweencompany-ownedand franchised 
outlets (see Williamson 1984). For example, 
consum rs do not know--or care--whether the 
McDonald's they patronize is franchised or 
company-owned. Thus, any marketing effort to 
regain consumers' loyalties is ineffective and the 
franchisee may be tempted to violate the relationship 
with its franchisor to secure positive profits. 
Firms that share the same trademark, whether 
franchised or company-owned,should be considered 
th  same organization within the same system since, 
in th  public's perception, they compete with 
independent outlets, other company-owned chains, 
and other franchise systems rather than with each 
other (Pilling, Henson and Yoo 1995). Under such 
conditions, the franchisee will expect to be charged 
less for royalties. Usually, the royalty fee is fixed as 
a percentage of a franchisee's sales, so the 
franchisor's net income fluctuates directly with the 
franchisee performance. However, when two 
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companies with the same trademark are located in 
close proximity,perfonnance can be a product of their 
rivalry as they compete and interfere with each other 
(Dant and Gundlach 1999, Ghosh and Craig 1991, 
Kaufinann and Rangan 1990, Zeller, Achabal and 
Brown 1980). Thus: 
Proposition 12. Higher levels of competition within 
the same franchise system reduces the franchisee's 
perfonnance. 
Franchisee's Power over the Franchisor 
The franchisee's power can be defined as the 
franchisee's ability to pressure the franchisor. 
Decreased franchise profitability due to increased 
rivalry makes the franchisee dissatisfied with its 
relationship with the franchisor. To secure the 
profitability expected when the contract was written, 
the franchisee will likely complain and request lower 
royalty fees or relocation of neighboring company-
owned units. Also, the franchisee will resist any 
attempts by the franchisor to expand the number of 
units in a given market (Zeller, Achabal and Brown 
1980). Even though a franchisee has firm-like 
features, the franchisee becomes a stronger residual 
claimant against the franchisor than the franchisor's 
employee-managerssincethe franchiseehas paid both 
an explicit up-front franchisee fee as ex ante bondage 
and on-going royalty fees as ex post bondage (Norton 
1988a, 1988b). Therefore, the franchisor is 
responsible for the franchisee's minimal profits. 
However, if the franchisor perceives the franchisee's 
request as reflective of incompatible role demands or 
expectations, then the franchisor's conflict level will 
increase (Pondy 1967). Consequently: 
Proposition 13. A franchisee's power over its 
franchisor increases conflict with the franchisor. 
Franchisor's Coercive Power 
Coercive power sources are punishments or threats 
such as delivery delay, charging higher royalty fees, 
taking legal action, and--particularly in franchising-­
the threat of franchise termination (see Hunt and 
Nevin 1974, Lusch and Brown 1982). Michie and 
Yoo and Sibley 
Sibl y (1985) operationalizedthe coercive sources of 
a franchisor's power as "the likelihood of the 
franchisorpunishingthe franchiseethroughthe use of 
specificbusiness activities" (p. 196). These sources 
are the effect of potential ex post franchisor 
opportunism on contract design in franchising 
relationships. A franchisor tends to include very 
opportunistic coercive powers in ex ante contracts to 
deal with eventualities such as uncertain demand or 
more attractive alternative investment opportunities 
(Dewatripont and Sekkat 1991). If a franchisor 
interferes with the franchisee's activities through 
coercive power, then conflict between the parties of 
the c annel dyad will increase (Schmidt and Kochan 
1972). Williamson (1984) said that credible threats 
appear in the context of conflict and rivalry. 
Research has consistently found that execution of 
coercive power increases conflict while the use of 
non-coercive power does not (Brown and Frazier 
1978, Lusch 1976, Wilkinson 1981). Thus: 
Proposition 14. If coercive power is exercised, then 
the franchisee's satisfaction decreases. 
Conflict 
Here, conflict refers to the franchisor's conflict, 
which is not necessarily equal to the franchisee's 
conflict(Gaski 1984). Essentialto conflictresolution 
procedures is whether or not continuing the 
relationship with the partner yields benefits in excess 
of costs (Pondy 1967). This crucial question must be 
resolved in the affirmative before deciding which 
strategy to use (see Dant and Schul 1992). If the 
benefits exceed the costs, the efforts to resolve the 
conflict will help continue the relationship. A wise 
egoistic firm will collaborate if continuous 
transactions offer benefits that surpass the financial 
and non-financial costs it will incur by exiting the 
relationship. Otherwise, the conflict will push the 
parties toward termination of the relationship. At 
this time, the franchisor may decide to extend its 
monopoly power in a given market by reacquiring 
some or all of the franchised outlets. This decision 
always presents a trade-off between the costs of 
man ging the conflict with the franchisees and the 
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agency costs of the company-ownedunits' managers 
(see Zeller, Achaba1and Brown 1980). In summary: 
Proposition 15. If the benefits exceed the costs, the 
franchisor will continue the relationship with its 
franchisee despite conflict. 
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS 
This category consists of external economic/ 
sociopolitical structure/processes. The external 
economyis definedas "the nature of its vertical (input 
and output) and horizontal markets" and the external 
polity is defined as "the distribution and use of power 
resources among external actors" (Stem and Reve 
1980, p. 54). Achrol, Reve and Stem (1983) propose 
the environmentalpluralism of channel dyads where 
the primary task environment (i.e., immediate 
suppliers and customers), the secondary task 
environment(i.e.,suppliersto the immediatesuppliers, 
customers to the immediate customers, regulatory 
agents and interest aggregators, and direct and 
potential competitors to the channel dyad), and the 
macro environment (i.e., general social, economic, 
political, and technological forces) are delineated (p. 
57). Additionally, the two task environments are 
dividedinto the input sector (i.e., all direct and indirect 
suppliers to the dyad), the output sector (i.e., all direct 
and indirect customers of the dyad, both distributors 
and end users), the competitivesector (i.e., actual and 
potential competitors of the channel dyad), and the 
regulatory sector (i.e., regulatory groups) (Achro1, 
Reve and Stem 1983). Following Arndt (1983), this 
paper directly considers other related environmental 
forces, to wit: (1) market maturity; (2) market density; 
(3) competition within industry; and (4) government 
regulation fairness. 
The environmentis definedas "a phenomenonenacted 
by the organizational decision makers within it" 
(Achrol and Stem 1988, p. 47). This environmentof 
the channel dyad affects the dyad's structure and 
performance. In particular, the degree of decision-
making uncertainty experienced by channel members 
is influenced by diversity among individual 
consumers, dynamism, concentration, and capacity 
rather than diversityamong organizationalcustomers, 
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interconnectedness via common input/output 
linkages,environmentalconflictand interdependence 
(Achrol and Stem 1988). 
External Economy 
Market Maturity 
This environmental force has been explained by a life 
cycle theory (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1969). Life cycle 
theory views franchising as a transitory phenomenon 
and predicts that once a mature stage is reached, 
most successful franchise systems will develop into 
large company -owned chains. Only poor-performing, 
marginal sites are expected to be run by franchisees 
since th ir low profitability will make company buy-
backs uneconomical. Franchising is more popular in 
a premature stage of the industry because a firm can 
grow rapidly and a significant part of the expanding 
firm's adjustment cost is the value of lost current 
production associated with selecting and training new 
managers (Faith, Higgins and Tollison 1984). Ifless 
c pable new managers are recruited, such poor 
employee/task matches lead to higher production 
costs. Thus, according to Carney and Gredaj10vic 
(1991), rapidly expanding firms will adopt a 
franchise system because the competent and 
motivated agents needed by these rapidly growing 
firms would demand franchisee status (i.e., they 
wo ld demand quasi-ownership, not employee, 
status). In summary, franchisees are a useful means 
for rapidly establishing a competent presence in the 
market (Cavaliere and Swerdlow 1988). Thus: 
Proposition 16. As the market matures, the 
f anchisor increases the proportion of company-
owned outlets. 
Market Density 
Market density is an industry's penetration of the 
target market and is measured by the number of 
establishments of an industry per capita in the 
arket. Agency theory predicts that greater 
geographical dispersion causes more monitoring 
problems for the firm (Brickley and Dark 1987, 
Norton 1988a, 1988b). First,managersofcompany­
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owned outlets may shirk their duties because their 
supervisors are out of sight. Second, greater 
dispersionof sites impliesmore supervisors and higher 
monitoring costs since more time is lost moving 
between sites. Therefore, it is expected that remote 
locations will be serviced by franchised units and 
geographically concentrated locations will be served 
by company outlets (Norton 1988a, 1988b). 
Similarly, company ownership is associated with 
urbanizationandhigherpopulationdensity(Thompson 
1992). Ifbrand name capital exists, a firm's physical 
dispersion amplifies the franchisor's vulnerability to 
quality debasingby a local outlet (Klein 1980). Thus, 
using local owner-managers, who make heavy site-
specific investmentsand post a large bond in the form 
of a franchisee fee, reduces the likelihoodof quality 
debasing, because a franchisee has much more to lose 
upon termination than a local employee-manager 
(Norton 1988a, 1988b). Consequently: 
Proposition 17. When market density increases, the 
franchisor increases the proportion of company-owned 
outlets. 
Competition Within Industry 
Achrol, Reve and Stem (1983) posit that lateral 
competitiveuncertainties may lead to less conflict and 
more cooperation within the channel dyad. 
Competitive threats make the channel dyad more 
cooperative because such threats are perceived as 
aggressive moves against the dyad from a common 
enemy. Therefore, it is expected that "the higher the 
uncertainty in the competitive sector of the task 
environmentof marketingchannel dyads, the higher is 
the level of cooperation within the dyad" (Achrol, 
Reve and Stem 1983, p. 64). In short: 
Proposition 18. As industry competitionincreases,the 
cooperation between franchisor and franchisee 
mcreases. 
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External Polity 
Government Regulation Fairness 
The ore uncertainty there is in the regulatory 
environment, the more opportunity there is for 
unfairness in the contractual agreement (Achrol, 
Reve and Stem 1983). Government plays an 
important role in preventingfranchisors from taking 
advantage of durable, immovable investments of all 
kind  (Williamson 1991). Therefore: 
Propo ition 19. Higher levels of government 
regulation reduce unfairness in the franchise 
contractual agreement. 
CONCL USION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This research suggests a framework of the 
franchisor's perspective on the decision to use 
franchised outlets, company-ownedoutlets, or both. 
Our framework harmoniously integrates within a 
political-economy model several paradigms--the 
access-to-capitalviewpoint,transaction cost analysis, 
population ecology perspective, and power­
dependence-conflictarguments. 
The political-economyparadigm has proven useful in 
intro ucing and classifying multiple theories in an 
ordered way (Stem 1988). By adding intra-firm 
factors which act as antecedents to inter-firm 
relations, the current research suggests a remedy to 
two of the weaknesses of the political-economy 
model: (1) the framework has only inter-firm 
variables, in which the antecedents of the inter-
organizational relations cannot be identified and (2) 
it shows no finite or foreseeabletermination points to 
a relationship. 
Despit  the popular and traditional capital-raising 
explanation for franchise organizations, this 
explanation has suffered from criticisms. First, 
franchising is not limited to small companies with 
restricted access to capital markets. There are a 
number of large companies that have sufficient 
access to capital markets, yet still choose to 
franchise. Second,there has been no direct empirical 
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evidenceregardingthe hypothesisthat franchisors will 
increasecompanyoperation as they mature and obtain 
better access to capital (Caves and Murphy 1976, 
Martin 1988). Third, franchisors commonly supply 
financingto their franchisees. Thus, such franchisors 
do not use franchising as a source of capital. Fourth, 
from a portfolio view of finance, franchising is a more 
expensive way of capital raising compared to public 
equity and debt claims or selling shares of the 
franchisor-owned units to their employees (Rubin 
1978). This is true when a risk-reluctant franchisee 
requires a high return on its investment because its 
investment in a single outlet is riskier than that in a 
portfolio of shares from all outlets in a chain (Rubin 
1978). In summary,the capital-raising explanation is 
not supported in a perfect capital market, which 
provides cheaper capital financing than does 
franchising. That is why this theory is called a 
capital-market imperfectionexplanation. 
Despite such criticism, redirection theory--that as a 
franchise becomes successful, franchisors repurchase 
the most profitable franchises-has been conceptually 
and empirically supported (Anderson 1984, Dant, 
Kaufinann and Paswan 1992, Hunt 1973, Lillis, 
Narayana and Gilman 1976, Oxenfe1dt and Kelly 
1968). Hunt's (1973) survey showed that, as the 
percentage of company-owned establishments 
increased, franchisors' hoped to own an even larger 
percentage of establishments in the future. Lillis, 
Narayana and Gilman's (1976) survey of fast food 
franchises found that the benefits of rapid market 
penetration promoted franchising but that fully 
integrated direct distribution became more popular as 
the franchise matured. Anderson (1984) and Dant, 
Kaufinann and Paswan (1992) posited that powerful 
franchisors expand their ownership shares by buying 
back the most successful franchised outlets. 
On the other hand, franchising does not appear to be 
a transitory stage on the way to complete ownership 
integration, which is predicted by capital-raising and 
franchisor's life cycle explanations. The conflict 
between owners and managers over the control and 
use of corporate resources breaks down the wholly 
company-owned operation without franchising (Jensen 
1989). Franchising provides remarkable benefits in 
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operating efficiency, employee productivity, and 
stockholder value, and thus franchising remains a 
comparatively efficient source of capital over time 
(Jensen 1989). Bradach and Eccles (1989) view 
franchising as the best among Williamson's (1985, 
1991) three types of organizational forms because a 
franchise system benefits both sides of a franchisor-
franch see relationship such as risk diversification, 
rapid local market penetration, flexible and quick 
responsiveness to changing circumstances, and 
economiesof scale. 
While previous theories tend to concentrate on a 
dyadic decisionmechanismwithin the same franchise 
system (i.e., one franchisor and its franchisees) and 
ignore the influences by other competitive. and 
environmental factors, the population ecology 
paradigm considers other competitors outside 
franchise systems (i.e., independentunits) but in the 
same industry and environments in which the units 
operate (see Lambkin and Day 1989, Pilling,Henson 
and Yoo 1995). Therefore, population ecology 
makes it possible to see the dynamics of the 
org ization from the political-economicperspective 
of the interactions of the channel dyad and its 
environment (Arndt 1983, Achrol, Reve and Stern 
1983). 
If the perception has been communicated that the 
franch or's power is overwhelming, that perception 
might be misleading. A franchisee commonly has the 
right to sell its business to a third party before the 
franchisor buys it back. Actually, the sale of an 
existing franchise by the franchisee is common. This 
occurs partly because of age, economic or lifestyle 
c nsiderations and partly because of actions 
responding to the threats and "unfair" behaviors of 
the franchisor. Moreover, even in the event of a buy­
back, the franchisor cannot coerce the franchisee into 
selling at 1ess-than-market prices. Indeed, many 
franc sors have paid premiums to buy back strong 
franchisee operations. 
B th of the parties have the means, symmetric or 
asymmetric, to destroy each other. While in an 
extreme situation a franchisor has the ability to 
refuse to renew the franchise agreement, its 
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franchisee can defraud it by underreporting its sales, 
corrupting the trademark, and neglecting required 
goals such as sales penetration. Heide and John 
(1988) hold that a finn with high transaction-specific 
investments offsets these investments by attempting to 
increase the substitutability of the assets. Therefore, 
we need to look at the interdependence of the dyad, 
which "exists whenever one actor does not entirely 
control all the conditions necessary for the 
achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome 
desired from the action" (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 
p.40). 
Future research is required to (1) investigate a 
franchisee's perspective of franchising versus 
independentownership, (2) connectthe franchisor and 
franchisee perspectives, and (3) test and improve the 
conceptual frameworks through empirical research. 
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